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INJURY TO REPUTATION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: CONFUSION AMID 
CONFLICTING APPROACHES 
George C. Christie* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 2, 197 6, the Supreme Court handed down its decision 
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone.1 Like most of the Court's recent pro-
nouncements in the area of defamation, this decision left the law 
more, rather than less, confused. In Firestone, the Court concluded 
that the plaintiff in a defamation action-the wife of a member of 
a prominent American family-was not a public figure and that her 
highly publicized divorce trial was not a public controversy.2 This 
decision ostensibly continued the erosion of protections afforded the 
defendant under the doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 
a process that had commenced-almost two year's earlier in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.4 The Court's decision in Firestone, however, 
was grounded on reasons that may, in the long run, actually restrict 
the ability of plaintiffs to bring actions for defamation. 
Less than three weeks after its Firestone decision, the Court 
handed down Paul v. Davis, 5 a decision that, although not in the 
Sullivan line of cases, may ultimately have great influence on the 
law of defamation. Davis, a newspaper photographer, had initi-
ated a class action in federal district court on the basis of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (civil action for deprivation of rights under color of state law) 
and the fourteenth amendment, against the police chiefs of Louisville, 
Kentucky, and of Jefferson County, Kentucky; he sought damages, 
as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The gravamen of Davis' 
complaint was that defendants had included his picture and name 
in a flyer, distributed to merchants, that purported to identify persons 
who "'have been arrested during 1971 or 1972 or have been active 
in various criminal fields in high density shopping areas.' "6 Each 
* Professor of Law, Duke University, School of Law. A.B., 1955, I.D. 1957, 
Columbia University; Dipl. Intl. Law 1962, Cambridge; S.I.D. 1966, Harvard Law 
School.-Ed. 
1. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
2. See text at notes 62-71 infra. 
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
4. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
5. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
6. 424 U.S. at 695. 
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of the five pages of the flyer had at the top in large capital letters 
the following notation: 
NOVEMBER 1972 




Davis' picture and name were included in the flyer because he had 
been charged with shoplifting and arrested in June 1971 by a store's 
private security police. At his arraignment in September 1971, 
Davis had pleaded not guilty. The charge against him had then 
been "filed away with leave [to -reinstate]," whioh, under Kentucky 
law, meant that it was still pending. 8 Shortly after the circulation 
of the flyer in late 1972, the charge was dismissed by a judge of 
the Louisville police court. 9 
The action against the two police chiefs was dismissed by the 
district court on the ground that Davis had failed to establish that 
he had " 'been deprived of any right secured to him by the Constitu-
tion of the United States.' "10 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reversed11 on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 12 which had found the "posting" of an 
individual as an excessive drinker to be unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court, in turn, reversed with an opinion written by Justice Rehn-
quist, who had also been the author of the Court's opinion in Fire-
stone. Justice Rehnquist held that defendant police chiefs' interfer-
ence merely with Davis' interest in his reputation was not actionable 
under section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment. At most, in the 
Court's view, plaintiff had alleged a claim, under state law, of tor-
tious defamation by state officials. Section 1983 and the fourteenth 
amendment did not make every tort by state officials a deprivation 
of rights secured under the fourteenth amendment. The Court dis-
tinguished Wisconsin v. Constantineau on the ground that more had 
been at stake in that case than mere reputation. Not only had Con-
stantineau been "posted" as an excessive drinker, but the fact of post-
ing made it unlawful for proprietors of liquor stores and taverns who 
had notice of the posting to sell liquor to her.18 
7. 424 U.S. at 695. 
8. 424 U.S. at 695-96. Keeping the charge alive under these circumstances 
would appear to be the type of conduct proscribed by Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 
U.S. 213 (1967). 
9. 424 U.S. at 696. 
10. 424 U.S. at 696. 
11. 424 U.S. at 696-97. 
12. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
13. 424 U.S. at 707-09. 
November 19761 Injury to Reputation and the Constitution 45 
Whatever the merits of the Court's decision in Paul v. Davis, 
of which more will be said later, 14 the decision obviously has impor-
tant implications for the law of defamation, especially in the context 
of actions against public officials. This article will focus on these 
implications in light of the Court's recent treatment of the subject 
of defamation, of which the Firestone decision is the latest example. 
In this regard, it is important to recall that the Court, in Sullivan, 15 
relied heavily on Barr v. Matteo,1 6 which had granted an absolute 
privilege to almost anything that a federal official might say within 
the outer perimeter of his duty. The Court, in Sullivan, observed 
that this doctrine severely restricted the ability of private individuals 
to succeed in a defamation action against federal officials. It further 
noted that most states granted a similar privilege to high-ranking 
officials, with at least a qualified privilege for lesser functionaries.17 
Accordingly, the Court reasoned in Sullivan, it should not be pos-
sible for a public official to bring an action against a private citi-
zen under conditions where the private citizen would have no 
action against the public official. Yet now, in Paul v. Davis, 
the Court has apparently attempted to justify its refusal to recognize 
a constitutionally based remedy against public officials by leaving the 
impression that plaintiffs like Davis may have an action for defama-
tion against public officials, despite Barr v. Matteo and the com-
parable state court cases. To say the least, this seems puzzlirig. If, 
in fact, the premise of the Court's decision in Paul v. Davis was ac-
tually that a private citizen neither has nor should have any tort rem-
edy for damage to his reputation caused by the false statements of 
public officials-and this certainly seems to be the actual result of 
its decision-the Court should have candidly said so. 
It is the thesis of this article that the long-run implications of 
Firestone and Paul v. Davis will force a radical reformulation of the 
circumstances under which an individual may obtain legal redress for 
injury to his reputation brought about by falsehoods. The Court will 
eventually be obliged to abandon its fragmented treatment of the sub-
ject: At present, some injured persons have no chance of recovery; 
others are faced with requirements of proof that make recovery very 
difficult; still others can recover under significantly more relaxed 
standards of proof. The nature of the Court's likely reformulation 
will be developed later in this article, after an examination of the 
unsatisfactory current state of the law. 
14. See text at notes 92-95 infra. 
15. 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964). 
16. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
17. 376 U.S. at 282. 
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Il. DEFAMATION AND THE COURT, 1964-197618 
A. New York Times Company v. Sullivan to Rosenbloom 
The years immediately following the Court's seminal decision in 
Sullivan19 witnessed a relatively orderly and steady expansion of the 
reach of that case. There the Court had held that, at least with re-
spect to the nonprivate aspects of their lives, public officials could 
not successfully bring actions for defamation without a showing of 
"malice" in the constitutional sense, defined to be either deliberate 
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Common-law malice, 
which could be established by proof of ill will toward the plaintiff 
or a desire to hurt him, was not enough. 2° Furthermore, as the 
Court several times made clear, "recklessness" could be proven only 
by some showing of conscious indifference to truth; a mere failure 
to investigate was insufficient. 21 Although there could not have 
been much doubt as to how it would decide the issue, the Court soon 
held that the same strictures applied · to prosecutions under state 
criminal libel laws. 22 
In the 1966 case of Rosenblatt v. Baer,28 the Court moved for-
ward to the position that the constitutional privilege enunciated in 
Sullivan applied in actions for defamation brought by relatively low-
ranking public officials or former public officials, at least when the 
actions were based on statements about their official conduct. In-
deed, after Rosenblatt, the Sullivan standards seemed to apply to any 
public employee, however minor his position, so long as the chal-
lenged statements concerned official conduct. The next year, in 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts24 and Associated Press v. Walker,2 r; 
the Court followed the lead of some lower courts and extended the 
privilege to statements concerning at least the nonprivate aspects of 
18. I am proceeding under the assumption that many readers have some familiar-
ity with this history. The truncated summary presented below is what is necessary 
as background for my discussion of Firestone and Paul v. Davis and the radical 
changes in the law that will be required to reconcile these cases to each other and 
to the prior legal development. For a more detailed survey of the Court's work-
product up through the Gertz case in 1974, as well as for a discussion of some of 
the lower court decisions, see Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analogical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 
1349 (1975). 
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
20. See Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1970); Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77-79 
(1964). 
21. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1968); Beckley News-
papers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967) (per curiam). 
22. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
23. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
24. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
25. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (reported sub nom. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts). 
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the lives of public figures, even those who were not involved in poli-
tics. Justice Harlan's suggestion26 in the Butts and Walker cases that 
public figures who were not public officials might be able to over-
come the privilege upon a showing of only gross negligence created 
some uncertainty, but he later abandoned that position.27 During 
the same term that Butts and Walker were decided, the Court fur-
ther indicated that a relatively unknown person could, by accidental 
involvement in an event of major newsworthiness, become a public 
figure, at least with regard to matters concerning the newsworthy 
event.28 
Finally, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,29 decided in 1971, 
the Court applied the privilege in an action brought by one who was 
hardly a public figure but who had become involved in a minor news-
worthy event; specifically, he had been arrested for selling allegedly 
obscene literature. There was no majority opinion, but Justice 
Brennan's plurality opinion seemed to presage the future. Discus-
sion of newsworthy events was said to be constitutionally protected, 
and, at least when the defendant was one of the news media, the 
Court seemed hesitant to second-guess the defendant's conclusion 
that the event in question was newsworthy. It is true that some fairly 
novel positions were advanced in the dissents. For example, Jus-
tices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart argued that presumed damages 
should no longer be allowed in any action for defamation. 30 Justice 
Marshall, in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart, even proposed the 
abolition of punitive damages. 31 In the view of these Justices, public 
officials and public figures would have to meet the standards enunci-
ated in Sullivan, but people like George Rosenbloom, who did not 
fit into either category, could recover for genuinely injurious defama-
tion upon a showing of negligence. The restrictions on damages, 
together Vt'.ith the requirement that some showing of fault be made, 
were believed sufficient to assure that some "breathing room" would 
be provided in the delineation of actionable kinds of speech, so that 
the fear of litigation and the imposition of crushing damages would 
not inhibit the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by the first 
amendment. 32 
26. 388 U.S. at 146-55. 
27. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 68-69 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting); cf. 403 U.S. at 72-78. 
28. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
29. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
30. 403 U.S. at 64 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 403 U.S. at 83-87 (Marshall, J., 
joined by Stewart, J., dissenting). 
31. 403 U.S. at 81-87. 
32. See 403 U.S. at 78-87. 
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B. After Rosenbloom: Partial Retreat and Disorder 
1. June 1974: The Gertz and Old Dominion Cases 
The apparent orderliness that had characterized the development 
of the principles enunciated in- Sullivan was at least partially de-
stroyed by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,88 decided by the Court in 
June 1974. The change in the Court's personnel was certainly re-
sponsible, in large measure, for the new tack. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, ·the newcomers to the Court accepted the Harlan/Marshall 
suggestion that the required first amendment protections be pro-
vided by restricting the scope of recoverable damages rather than 
by extending the application of the constitutional malice standard ar-
ticulated in Sullivan.84 Justice Powell, writing for the Court in 
Gertz, declared that the Sullivan requirements applied in actions in-
stituted by public officials or public figures against broadcasters and 
publishers. In actions brought by others against "publishers and 
broadcasters," however, some showing of fault is all that is necessary 
to establish liability. But the plaintiff may recover only actual dam-
ages, unless he can satisfy the constitutional malice requirement of 
Sullivan. 
Justice Brennan, dissenting, reaffirmed his Rosenbloom plurality 
opinion35 that any media discussion of an event of general interest, 
involving any individual, was deserving of the protection provided 
by the Sullivan constitutional malice standard. No other Justice 
joined his dissent. 36 He was thus no longer able to continue to con-
trol the development of the law whose broad outlines he had first 
mapped out in his opinions for the majority in Sullivan and in Rosen-
blatt v. Baer,37 and whose future course he had attempted to direct 
in his opinion for the Rosenbloom plurality. Predictably, Justice 
Douglas also dissented, in an opinion that reiterated his view that 
states are constitutionally prohibited from allowing recovery in libel 
actions arising out of public discussion of public issues. 38 Chief J us-
33. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
34. 418 U.S. at 345-50. 
35. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
36. 418 U.S. at 361. Justice Brennan conceded that Gertz was not a public 
figure, but he argued that, as in Rosenbloom, the subject matter was one of public 
or general interest. Justice Blackmun, who had concurred in Justice Brennan's 
Rosenbloom opinion, indicated that, if a majority of the Court were prepared to 
accept Justice Brennan's position, he was prepared to continue to adhere to that 
position as the correct view, but he felt that the need to create a majority for some 
single position overrode that consideration. 418 U.S. at 353-54. The other member 
of the Court who concurred with Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom, Chief Justice 
Burger, showed no regret in abandoning that position. 418 U.S. at 354. 
37. 383 U.S. 75 (1966), discussed in text at note 23 supra. 
38. 418 U.S. at 356. 
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tice Burger3° and Justice White40 dissented for a very different rea-
son. In their view Gertz ought to have been allowed the remedy 
available to him at common law because he was a private figure. 
Justice White's dissent is interesting because he suggests that the 
first amendment concerns of the majority can be accommodated by 
adopting .the libel ,per se/libel per quod distinction, 41 a position with 
which the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts had briefly 
flirted but already abandoned by the time Justice White embraced 
it,42 
The difficulties opened up by Gertz are apparent. The first 
arises from the majority's rejection of Justice Brennan's suggestion, 
in Rosenbloom, that mere involvement in a newsworthy event is 
enough to trigger the applicability of the Sullivan standards. As a 
consequence, in every case involving a plaintiff who is not a public 
official, the courts must determine whether that plaintiff is a public 
figure. Involvement in an event of public interest- is a factor to be 
considered48-one can involuntarily become a public figure even 
after Gertz-but it is no longer determinative. 44 This concern of 
the prevailing Justices in Gertz for a detailed factual inquiry into 
whether a person is a public figure for purposes of deciding a libel 
case echoes a suggestion made by Justice Goldberg, concurring in 
Sullivan. 45 Justice Goldberg asserted that even public officials can 
have a private aspect to their lives, as to which the constitutional pro-
tections enunciated in Sullivan46 do not apply in actions for defama-
tion. There may not be much of a zone of privacy for public offi-
cials in this post-Watergate era, but the same cannot be said for pub-
lic figures who are not officials. Gertz even suggests that one may 
be a public figure for some purposes but not for others, 47 a distinc-
tion that can be made with particular force when a purported public 
figure is not involved in politics or public affairs. Thus, the scope 
of the protections afforded to a defendant in an action for defamation 
will depend upon the intricate and often highly subjective determina-
39. 418 U.S. at 354-55. 
40. 418 U.S. at 369-404. 
41. 418 U.S. at 374-76. 
42. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 
1966), with id. (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
43. 418 U.S. at 351-52. 
44. 418 U.S. at 346. 
45. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
46. 376 U.S. at 301-02 & n.4. 
47. 418 U.S. at 351-52 (1974). "Absent clear evidence of general fame or 
notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an 
individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life." 418 
U.S. at 352. 
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tion of not only whether, but also for what purposes, the plaintiff 
may be considered a public figure. 
A second difficulty with Gertz is the possibility that different 
standards for establishing liability may apply depending upon 
whether the defendant is a "publisher or broadcaster." Each time 
Justice Powell stated his holding he was careful to insert these 
words;48 he must, therefore, have meant to exclude from considera-
tion those situations involving two private citizens who are uncon-
nected with the media. Certainly, Chief Justice Burger, in his dis-
sent, so understood Justice Powell's position. 49 It must be noted, 
moreover, that Justice Stewart, who has publicly expressed the view 
that the media are in fact granted special protections by the first 
amendment, 50 joined in Justice Powell's opinion for the Court. After 
Gertz, therefore, we are left wondering whether an action between 
private parties is to be governed by the common law. Another un-
resolved issue is the scope of the constitutional privilege enunciated 
in Sullivan in actions brought by public officials and public figures 
against nonmedia defendants. Does the privilege apply only when 
the defendant is one of the media or when the statements in ques-
tion appeared in the media? Almost all the relevant cases, it should 
be noted, have fit into these two categories. 
As if the confusion that was unleashed by Gertz were not enough, 
on the same day that Gertz was announced, the Court handed down its 
decision in Old Dominion Branch 496, National Association of Letter 
Carriers v. Austin. 51 In that case the three plaintiff letter carriers, 
who were among a group of fifteen out of 435 who were not mem-
bers of the local branch of the National Association of Letter 
Carriers, were described as "scabs" in the union's newsletter and 
then likened to Esau, Judas, and Benedict Arnold. The news-
letter continued by quoting Jack London's definition of a "scab" 
as a person who was "'a traitor to his God, his country, his family 
and his class.' "52 The plaintiffs had recovered substantial damages 
in the trial court, and the Virginia supreme court had affirmed. 113 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Presumably, it could 
have reached this result by following the rationale of Rosenblatt v. 
48. See, e.g., 418 U.S. at 347, 348, 350. 
49. 418 U.S. at 354-55. Justice Powell's opinion was also interpreted in this 
f~hion in Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: Whal 
Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975). 
50. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
51. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). 
52. 418 U.S. at 268. 
53. Old Dominion Branch 496, Natl. Assn. of Letters Carriers v. Austin, 213 Va, 
377, 192 S.E.2d 737 (1972). 
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Baer54 and holding that, since the plaintiffs were public employees, 
their detractors were protected by the Sullivan standards. However, 
the Court, writing through Justice Marshall, did not follow this path, 
perhaps because, unlike Justice Douglas in Rosenblatt, it was not 
prepared to hold that all public employees were really public offi-
cials. Instead, it held that the Sullivan standards were applicable 
because the statements in question were made in the course of what 
was arguably a "labor dispute."55 Thus, on the same day that the 
Court narrowly confined the reach of the constitutional privilege 
enunciated in Sullivan to the category of public figures, it also held 
that these standards were applicable in a case involving persons far 
less "public" than Gertz merely because of the context in which the 
alleged defamation was published. There was no indication whether 
the Sullivan standards might apply to statements in other special 
contexts. 
More constructive, for purposes of clarifying the law of defama-
tion, was the Court's alternate holding in Old Dominion that the 
statements in the newsletter were not actionable because they in-
volved mere expressions of opinion and the use of epithets. 56 In 
this regard Old Dominion is consistent with Gertz, in which Justice 
Powell declared for the Court that statements of opinion that do not 
amount to false statements of fact are not actionable no matter how 
pernicious they may be. 57 The Court's pronouncements on this 
issue in Old Dominion and Gertz forced the American Law Institute 
to adopt the position that neither opinion nor ridicule could be made 
the basis of a libel action, a position that the Institute had expressly 
54. See text at note 23 supra. 
55. The Court relied on the earlier Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers 
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), which held that defamatory statements made 
about management officials during a union organizing campaign, although within 
the jurisdiction of the NLRB, could also be the subject of an action for dam-
ages under state law, provided that the Sullivan standards were met and that actual 
damages were shown. State actions for defamation were thus not totally preempted 
by federal labor law. The Court in Old Dominion did not allude to the actual dam-
age requirement of Linn. It should also be pointed out that not only was the finding 
of a "labor dispute" in Old Dominion much more problematical than in Linn but 
the presence of a truly independent administrative agency was lacking in situations 
involving federal employees. The closest analogue to the NLRB is the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations, but appeal even to this nonin-
dependent administrative officer was almost certainly not available to the plaintiffs 
in Old Dominion. Old Dominion has thus gone considerably beyond Linn. It should 
finally be noted that, when Linn was decided, the Court had not extended the appli-
cation of the Sullivan standards to cases not involving public officials. Indeed, rather 
than argu~ about the scope of the Sullivan case, the four dissenters in Linn thought 
the matter was totally preempted by federal law. See 383 U.S. at 67-74. 
56. 418 U.S. at 282-87. 
57. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). 
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refused to accept less than five weeks prior to the decision of these 
cases.58 
In all other respects, however, these two cases only confused 
what had previously been a fairly orderly development of the consti-
tutional dimensions of the law of defamation. The confusion was 
underlined, even as to the issues involved in Old Dominion, by Jus-
tice Powell's dissent in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist joined. 59 The dissenters maintained that the statements in 
question did not actually concern a "labor dispute" because, for 
example, the controversy did not appear to be the kind of matter 
which, if nonpublic employees were involved, could be cognizable 
by the NLRB. 0° Furthermore, the dissenters argued, these state-
ments were indeed statements of fact; they were not mere opinions 
or hyperbole. 61 
Such was the state of the law when the Court handed down 
Time, Inc. v. Firestone62 and Paul v. Davis this past term. 
2. Spring 1976: The Firestone Case 
The basic facts of Firestone were as follows. Alice Firestone 
brought a suit for separate maintenance against her husband, 
Russell Firestone, who was described in Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion for the Court as "the scion of one of America's 
wealthier industrial families. "63 He counterclaimed for divorce on 
the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. After a lengthy trial, 
the Florida trial court granted Russell Firestone's request for a di-
vorce. In rendering his judgment, the trial judge noted that " '[a]c-
cording to certain testimony . . . extramarital escapades of the plain-
tiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made 
Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testimony . . . would indicate that de-
fendant was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another with 
the erotic zest of a satyr.' "64 The trial judge, however, stated that 
S8. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 
1975), with id. §§ 566, 567A (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). On May 23, 1974, a 
little• over a month before the Gertz and Old Dominion cases, the American Law 
Institute by an overwhelming vote rejected a motion to strike sections 566 and 567A 
as they appeared in the 1974 draft. 1974 PROCEEDINGS, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTI• 
TOTE 339. 
59. 418 U.S. 264, 291 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
60. 418 U.S. at 291-96. The dispute would thus not come within the somewhat 
analogous, but less formalized, regulatory scheme for federal employees. See note 
55 supra. 
61. 418 U.S. at 291, 296-97. 
62. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
63. 424 U.S. at 4S0. 
64. 424 U.S. at 4S0-51. 
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he was " 'inclined to discount much of this testimony as unreliable,' " 
and instead concluded that " 'neither party is domesticated.' "65 He 
granted the divorce and awarded Mrs. Firestone $3,000 per month 
until her death or remarriage. In its issue for the following week, 
Time magazine noted the divorce in its "Milestones" section, which 
stated that the Firestones had been divorced on the grounds of ex-
treme cruelty and adultery. The article concluded by reporting that 
"'[t]he 17-month intermittent :trial produced enough .testJimony of 
extramarital adventures on both sides,' said the judge, 'to make Dr. 
Freud's hair curl.' "66 Alice Firestone then brought a libel action 
against Time, Inc., in the Florida state courts and recovered a judg-
ment for $100,000, premised on the conclusion that Time had incor-
rectly asserted that her husband had been granted a divorce upon 
the grounds of her adultery. In appealing this judgment to the Su-
preme Court, Time, Inc., contended that the Sullivan protections 
applied to the statements in question and that the Florida courts were 
thus prohibited by the first and fourteenth amendments from imposing 
liability on the magazine. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected the defendant's 
contention because he had concluded that Mrs. Firestone was not 
a public figure and -the matter was not one of those public contro-
versies that, in themselves, merited application of the Sullivan stand-
ards. Applying the Gertz standards, the Court first found Mrs. Fire-
stone's allegations and proof of humiliation to be a sufficient showing 
of actual damages to support the jury verdict. 67 However, the Court 
then determined that the Florida courts, par:ticularly the trial court, 
had failed to address the question whether Time had been at "fault" 
in the sense described in Gertz; accordingly, the judgment was va-
cated and the case remanded. Justice Brennan dissented, of course, 
reasoning that "erroneously reporting the results of a public judicial 
proceeding" was not actionable. 68 Justice Marshall dissented because 
he thought Mrs. Firestone was a "public figure.'' 69 
Justice White based his dissent on quite different grounds. He 
argued that Mrs. Firestone, like Mr. Gertz, should be allowed to pur-
sue her common-law remedy without regard to the notions of fault 
65. 424 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added). 
66. 424 U.S. at 452. 
67. 424 U.S. at 460. One of the curious aspects of the case is that, on the eve 
of the trial, Mrs. Firestone dropped her claim for damages for injury to reputation. 
424 U.S. at 460. This had the effect of making her action in some ways more like 
one for injurious falsehood or a false-light invasion of privacy than for defamation. 
See note 113 infra. 
68. See 424 U.S. at 471. 
69. See 424 U.S. at 484. 
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that the Court had superimposed upon the common law in Gertz. 70 
Although Justice White's dissent in Firestone was consistent with his 
dissent in Gertz, it was nevertheless inconsistent with ,the position 
he had taken in Rosenbloom. In Rosenbloom, Justice White had 
refused to join in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, but he did con-
cur in the Court's judgment. His stated reason for doing so was that 
the case concerned the conduct of public officials, namely the actions 
and statements of the police in arresting George Rosenbloom on 
charges of dealing in obscene publications. 71 There is obviously no 
way that his position in the Firestone case, which involved comment 
on the activities of a Florida trial judge, can be reconciled with the 
views he held in the Rosenbloom case, and he must, therefore, be 
presumed to have abandoned them sub silentio. 
The difficulties with the majority opinion in Firestone are sev-
eral. Most obvious is the Court's conclusion that the plaintiff was 
not a public figure. The majority held that being married to a 
wealthy man who was a member of a well-known family did not 
make Mrs. Firestone a public figure. Nor did her activity in the 
social life of Palm Beach make her one, at least not in a national 
sense. Finally, the fact that Mrs. Firestone held press conferences 
during the pendency of the divorce proceedings did not indicate that 
she had thrust herself into the public eye because, the Court ex-
plained, she held these conferences in an attempt to satisfy inquiring 
reporters.72 Justice Marshall73 is not alone in finding the Court's con-
clusion on these facts questionable, to say the least. A further, more 
conceptual, difficulty is raised by the majority's intimation that Mrs. 
Firestone might possibly have been considered a public figure if the 
inaccurate story had been published in the local press. 74 How would 
the Court go about defining the geographical borders of a person's 
"public figuredom"? If Mrs. Firestone were an admittedly public 
figure in the state of Florida or in a substantial portion of that state, 
the Court would be hard pressed to justify a holding that she was 
not to be considered a public figure in a case involving a nationa] 
publication. 
10. See 424 U.S. at 481. If the Gertz requirements of fault were to be ac-
cepted, Justice White argued, they should only be applied to cases in which the de-
famatory matter was published after that decision. 424 U.S. at 482-84. 
71. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 58-62 (1971). 
72. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 & n.3 (1976). 
73. 424 U.S. at 484-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
74. 424 U.S. at 453, where there is the concession that Mrs. Firestone might 
have achieved the requisite notoriety in Palm Beach. "Respondent did not assume 
any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm 
Beach . • . ." Presumably, then, a Palm Beach newspaper would have had the 
Sullivan protections in commenting upon Mrs. Firestone's divorce. 
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In many ways, however, the most crucial aspect of the Court's 
decision in Firestone was not its refusal to classify Mrs. Firestone 
as a public figure but its insistence that a divorce proceeding is not 
a matter of "public controversy."75 Quoting from Boddie v. Connec-
ticut, 76 the Court noted .that people are forced to resort to the courts 
in order to obtain a divorce. The suggestion is very clear: Even 
a public figure might be able to use the divorce courts without be-
coming subject to the Sullivan standards should he bring an action 
for defamation for the erroneous reporting of what transpired in 
those divorce proceedings. It is very disturbing to realize that the 
Court really means to pursue the position that it had sketched out 
in Gertz. Under the guise of deciding when a person is a public 
figure, it will be the final arbiter of what can be a matter of legit-
imate public interest. What had generally been regarded as the dis-
credited por.tion of Warren and Brandeis' germinal article on pri-
vacy77-that the courts should inhibit the publication of personal gos-
sip and of trivia-has now apparently been reinstated. One can 
only describe this development as astounding. 
ill. INJURY TO REPUTATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A. Defamation and the First Amendment 
It is obvious that the accommodation established in Firestone and 
Gertz between the first amendment and the individual's interest in 
the integrity of his reputation will be an unstable one. As we have 
just noted, 78 courts simply should not, in a free society, take it upon 
themselves to determine what is newsworthy and what is not. The 
sheer volume of cases would, as a practical matter, make it difficult 
for the courts to fill this role even if they were qualified to do so. 
Moreover, unless the courts are going to become censors, certain 
areas in which the subject matter will per se be of public interest 
will have to be carved out; almost anything said in the course of a 
controversy involving that subject matter will receive the benefit of 
the Sullivan privilege. We have already seen the Court, in Old Do-
minion, identifying anything that could remotely be considered a 
"labor dispute" as one such area of discourse. 79 Presumably, politics 
75. 424 U.S. at 454. 
76. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
77. Compare Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 
(1890), with Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966). 
78. See text at note 77 supra. 
79. See text at note 55 supra. 
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and foreign policy will also be included. Perhaps subjects like secu-
rities regulation and consumer protection will be treated in this way 
as well. 
Because similar considerations affect whether a person is 
deemed a public figure, it was formerly difficult for a plaintiff to 
show that he was not a public figure. Indeed, Justice Brennan's 
solution in the Rosenbloom case, which gives the media a virtual 
carte blanche in deciding what is a matter of general interest, was 
formulated precisely to avoid having cases tum on the difficult deci-
sion of whether a plaintiff is a public figure. These considerations 
may well pressure the Court to return to the position outlined by 
Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom. It might be noted in this regard that, 
in March 1975, almost a year after Gertz and a year prior to Fire-
stone, the Court struck down a Georgia statute that prohibited the 
public dissemination of the names of rape victims. Only Justice 
Rehnquist dissented, and he did so on procedural grounds. The 
Court, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,80 invalidated the statute 
because "[t]he commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, 
and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions are without 
question events of legitimate concern to the public and consequ_ently 
fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations of 
government. "81 Because the matter was one of "legitimate concern 
to the public," Sullivan would presumably have been applicable in 
any defamation action that might have arisen if Cox Broadcasting had 
gotten its facts wrong. If this is so, why are the operations of divorce 
courts, as in Firestone, matters of less "legitimate concern to the 
public"? If, however, the Court did not mean to imply in Cohn that 
the Sullivan standards would have been applicable in a defamation 
action, what did it mean by using the phrase "legitimate concern to 
the public"? Justice Rehnquist, in Firestone, adopted a restrictive 
interpretation of Cohn by concluding that it protected only accurate 
reports of judicial proceedings.82 We are thus faced with one type of 
"public concern" that provides those exercising their first amendment 
rights some protections but not others. Then there is a more legiti-
mate "public concern," which the courts will determine on a case-by-
case basis, that adds further protections, such as those of Sullivan. 
Nothing more ridiculous nor as restrictive of freedom of speech can be 
envisaged. The utter inadequacy of the Court's intellectual approach 
reinforces the original suspicion, premised on the practical difficulty 
80. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
81. 420 U.S. at 492. 
82. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455-57 (1976). 
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of making the necessary factual determinations, that, unless a more 
drastic solution is adopted, a return to Justice Brennan's Rosenbloom 
solution may be inevitable. 83 . 
Another difficulty begotten by the Firestone/ Gertz resolution is 
the apparent conclusion that, somehow, the first amendment pro-
vides greater protection to the media than it grants the rest of us. 
The textual basis of this proposition is that the first amendment pro-
hibits Congress from making laws "abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press." On the assumption that the drafters of the Bill 
of Rights would not have used two terms where one would do, the 
argument concludes that the freedom of the press must in some ways 
be different from the freedom of speech. Justice Stewart has, of 
course, openly espoused this view. 84 While Gertz and Firestone 
lend some support to this view, the Court had in fact already rejected 
it in Branzburg v. Hayes, 85 on the only occasion when the issue has 
been specifically addressed. The proposition that freedom of the 
press is in some ways different from freedom of speech has received 
83. Anyone with any doubts is advised to examine one commentator's tortured 
attempt, at the conclusion of a long historical survey, to synthesize what the Court 
had done in the period ending with the Gertz decision. See Eaton, supra note 18, at 
1443-51, and particularly at 1448-51. This attempt was made without consideration 
of the additional complications presented by the conjunction of Firestone and Paul 
v. Davis. 
The difficulty of making the distinctions required by the Gertz case do not, how~ 
ever, seem to trouble one recent writer. See Robertson, Defamation and the First 
Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. Rsv. 199 (1976). 
Professor Robertson, it should be noted, does not discuss the public issue complica-
tion introduced by the Old Dominion case which, as already pointed out, was decided 
on the same day as Gertz. See text at note 51 supra. He sees the Old Dominion 
case as one merely involving a "labor dispute," id. at 202 n.22, and he cites the lower 
court decision in the case as a holding that the matter involved was not a "matter of 
public interest," with the notation "rev'd on other grounds." Id. at 206 n.50. Eaton, 
supra note 18, does make some slightly greater mention of the Old Dominion case, 
again in footnotes, at 1388-89, 1404-05, and 1448, but he too sees it, and the earlier 
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), as merely 
carving out a labor dispute exception. He does not seem to be troubled with a legal 
resolution under which speech is freer in the context of a labor dispute than in one 
of the paradigmatic first amendment situations-political disputes among private citi-
zens. 
Colorado, incidentally, adhered to the Rosenbloom plurality and rejected the Gertz 
solution in a case involving antique dealers who were neither public figures nor public 
officials but who came to the public eye by innocently buying some stolen furniture. 
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., _ Colo. -, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 1025 (1975) (negligent reporter absolved; judgment upheld against publisher 
found recklessly to have published other stories about plaintiffs). See also Aafco 
Heating & Air Cond. Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., _ Ind. App. -, 321 
N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). Contra, Troman v. Wood, 62 
Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1976); Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 
76 (1975); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., _ Mass. -, 330 N.E.2d 161 
(Mass. 1975). 
84. See text at note 50 supra. 
8$. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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some distinguished academic support, 88 despite the fact that it is gen-
erally accepted that the founding fathers used the terms interchange-
ably and that when they spoke about freedom of the press they were 
probably adverting to Blackstone's idea of no "prior restraints," 
which is really the freedom to publish. 87 Given the Crown's particu-
lar harassment of pamphleteers and others who sought to use the 
printing press to reach a wider audience, this concern was certainly 
understandable. It is still asserted, however, that, notwithstand-
ing the historical context, the Constitution does use two terms and 
therefore the Court has a textual basis for distinguishing between 
the two freedoms. This contention has, I believe, been thoroughly 
and convincingly refuted by others, 88 and it would serve no purpose 
for me to rehearse the argument. Whatever theoretical merit the 
position may have, it will almost ceritainly flounder in practice when 
it comes time to decide what is covered by the term "the press. "89 
If the New York Times. is covered, what about Screw, another 
New York publication? Consider too the person who wants to write 
a book. 90 Will it matter whether this individual is considered a 
"scholar"? The practical difficulties seem insurmountable. 
We have thus far seen that, in order to limit the scope of Sulli-
van's constitutional privilege, the Court has tried to put some sub-
stance in the notions of "public figure" and "newsworthy event"; 
these are the persons and events with which the public has a "legit-
imate" concern. When there is no such "public figure" or "news-
worthy event," the interest in personal reputation should, in the 
Court's view, receive greater protection. Nevertheless, to protect 
the "press," presumed damages will not be allowed and some show-
ing of fault on thy part of -the defendant media will be required. But, 
as just argued, the distinction between the press and the rest of us 
will simply not hold up, either on historical or practical grounds. 
Thus, the Court's concern to limit the scope of the Sullivan privilege 
and to retain as much as possible of the common law of defamation 
will likely result in a substantial restriction of the common law in 
all defamation actions, whether brought against rthe media or not. 
86. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 49. 
87. Id. at 640-41. See also L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960); Lange, The 
Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 88-99 (1975). 
88. See Lange, supra note 87. But see Nimmer, Speech and Press: A Brief Reply, 
23 UCLA L. REV. 120 (1975). 
89. See Lange, supra note 87, at 99-107. 
90. Cf. United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 
909 (1972). In this case, Popkin, an assistant professor at Harvard, was denied 
any privileges not enjoyed by citizens at large to refuse to answer questions before 
a grand jury concerning the leakage of the "Pentagon Papers." 
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To this extent, the fears of Justice White, who dissented in Gertz 
and Firestone, seem well-founded. Furthermore, as argued previ-
ously, 91 the basis upon which the Court in Gertz and Firestone con-
cluded that neither public figures nor newsworthy events were in-
volved in those cases seems suspect. Many reasonable people would 
have reached the opposite conclusiqn on the facts of both those 
cases. The Court will, so it seems, be under pressure ,to move back 
to the Rosenbloom plurality position, that public figures and news-
worthy events can themselves be created by the attention of the 
media and the often ephemeral curiosity of the public, even when 
triggered by false reports. By recognizing the existence of areas of 
public interest in the Old Dominion case, the Court has already ac-
knowledged, and I think correctly, that whether or not an issue or 
controversy is of legitimate public concern is, in at least some areas, 
a matter upon which the presumption must run in favor of the 
speaker, regardless of whether he can be characterized as a member 
of the media. 
In short, my contention is that, far from providing a firm base 
for ,the continued existence of the· common-law action of defamation, 
the Court, in its recent decisions, has now arrived at a point where, 
practically speaking, no plaintiff will be able to recover in an action 
for defamation or any other injurious falsehood unless he can show 
actual damages and fault. Furthermore, on a large range of issues, 
which will inevitably expand, there will be no recovery absent a 
Sullivan showing of actual malice, regardless of who the defendant 
is, although as a practical matter it may be easier for a so-called 
media defendant to invoke the protection of the Sullivan doctrine than 
for a mere "private person" to do so. 
B. Constitutional Redress for Injury to Reputation 
by Public Officials 
If the law of defamation will become increasingly unable to pro-
vide relief to a person whose reputation has been damaged by the 
publication of falsehoods, are •there any other legal remedies to 
which he may tum for redress? Certainly falsehoods circulated by 
public officials involve state action. It would have been reasonable 
to expect that, at least in some circumstances, an individual might 
obtain relief in the federal courts under section 198392 in cases in-
volving state officials, and under the doctrine established in Bivens 
91. See text at note 72 supra. 
92. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970). 
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v. Six Unknown Named Agents,03 in cases involving federal officials. 
As we have already seen, however, the Court foreclosed this possibil-
ity in Paul v. Davis. That decision is in some ways an odd one. Ad-
mittedly, Wisconsin v. Constantineau,04 the case that is closest to 
Paul v. Davis on its facts, is distinguishable because posting Constan-
tineau as a drunk prevented her from buying liquor. No such im-
mediate consequence necessarily flowed from the flyer circulated in 
Paul v. Davis, although there was some evidence that being named in 
the flyer caused Davis some difficulty with his employer. or, But there 
are some recent cases dealing with injury to the reputation of private 
citizens caused by public officials that are not so easily distinguished, 
even if they are not so obviously analogous to Paul v. Davis as is 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau. For example, in Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 96 the one-year contract of a young faculty member at Wisconsin 
State University-Oshkosh was not renewed. Roth, the faculty member, 
claimed that due process required that he be given a statement of 
reasons, but the Court, writing through Justice Stewart, disagreed. 
The state had done nothing "that might seriously damage his 
(Roth's) standing and associations in his community."07 It had not, 
for example, charged him with dishonesty or immorality. Had it 
done so, "due process would accord an oppo1tunity to refute the 
charge .... "98 Justice Stewart then declared: 
In the present case, however, there is no suggestion whatever that the 
respondent's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" is at stake. 
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the state, in declining to 
re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other dis-
ability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employ-
ment opportunities. 99 
Yet in Paul v. Davis, the plaintiff had been stigmatized by the flyer 
identifying him as a shoplifter, and his employment opportunities 
were probably seriously restricted-as evidenced by his employer's 
annoyance-even if they were not completely foreclosed. It would 
93. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
94. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 ( 1971). 
95. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 696 (1976). As a result of the flyer, Davis 
was called in by his supervisor and, although not fired, was told that "he 'had best 
not find himself in a similar situation' in the future." 
96. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
. 97. 408 U.S. at 573. 
98. 408 U.S. at 573. 
99. 408 U.S. at 573. In Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), decided a few 
months after Paul v. Davis, one of the reasons given for denying relief against city 
officials to a fireman discharged from his job was that, because there had been no 
public disclosure of the grounds for his being discharged, proof was lacking that he 
had been so stigmatized as to hurt his chances of future employment. 96 s. Ct. at 
2079. 
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seem, then, that the Court in Paul v. Davis was willing to overlook 
the very effects on an individual's reputation that had concerned Jus-
tice Stewart in Roth. 
The result in Paul v. Davis is even more difficult to reconcile 
with Jenkins v. McKeithen,100 where the Court upheld a constitu-
tional attack, based on the failure to grant petitioner adequate proce-
dural protections, against a Louisiana Labor-Management Commis-
sion authorized to make public findings that particular people were 
engaged in violations of Louisiana or United States criminal laws 
dealing with ·labor-management relations. The Court held that the 
state could not stigmatize people in this way without affording them 
substantial procedural protections. Particularly noteworthy, for our 
purposes, is the absence of any allegation or proof on the record that 
the potential stigmatization of Jenkins would have foreclosed any 
particular employment opportunities for him. 
I leave for others the task of reconciling Paul v. Davis with Roth 
and Jenkins v. McKeithen, although I suspect that it will be difficult 
to produce a convincing reconciliation. Rather, accepting for the 
moment that there are adequate bases for distinguishing the cases, we 
must ask what effect the Court's decision .in Paul v. Davis will have on 
the individual's right to seek redress for injury done by public officials 
to his reputation. As already noted, Justice Rehnquist assumed that 
the conduct Davis complained of was tortious under state law.101 
Justice Rehnquist's point was that not every tort committed by a pub-
lic official gives rise to a cause of action based upon a deprivation 
of constitutional rights, an assertion that is probably correct but does 
not prove much. The question is whether Justice Rehnquist was cor-
rect in assuming that Davis "might have a tort claim under state law. 
Consider, for instance, the relatively well-established principle tha:t, 
were Davis complaining ~f the actions of federal law enforcement offi-
cials, he would have no state cause of action for defamation. The case 
would be squarely governed by Barr v. Matteo102 and the absolute 
privilege it granted federal officials for statements within the outer 
perimeters of their duty. Warning shopkeepers of suspected shop-
lifters is well within the outer perimeters of the duties of law enforce-
ment officials. Similarly, the states almost uniformly grant at least 
a qualified privilege to their own officials under these circum-
100. 395 U.S. 411 (1969). 
101. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-99 (1976). 
102. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). For an instance where the attempt to bring such an 
action against a federal law enforcement official was summarily dismissed, see 
Scherer v. Morrow, 401 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969). 
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stances, 103 and there is some tendency in the state courts to follow 
federal law and grant to relatively high-ranking administrators, like 
police chiefs, the absolute privilege previously granted only to gov-
ernors and other senior officials.104 Indeed, the Court's decision in 
Sullivan was at least partially based on the assumption that the public 
official who had sued for defamation was himself protected by a doc-
trine like that enunciated in Barr v. Matteo from a defamation action 
for statements in his official capacity unless, at the very least, the 
private 9itizens were able to show "actual malice."105 
In sum, Davis was denied a remedy under the Constitution be-
cause, the Court said, he had a remedy under state law. But sup-
pose a person like Davis does not have such a remedy, as he may 
well not, particularly against a federal law enforcement official. 
Is he to go remediless? Moreover, as we have just seen, the Court's 
activities in the field of defamation are quite possibly rendering illusory 
the availability of any potential action for defamation. At the 
· very least, a plaintiff will have to show actual damages and prove 
negligence, but even that may not be enough. Given any substantial 
public interest in the subject matter, proof of intentional falsehood 
or reckless disregard of truth may be necessary, in accordance with 
the reasoning in Old Dominion, 106 to recover anything at all. More-
over, there will be inexorable pressure-so long as a double standard 
is used-to extend the Sullivan standards to new classes of plaintiffs, 
either because the event in question is newsworthy or because, for 
some limited purpose, plaintiff is a public figure. 
The law clearly cannot remain in such an unsatisfactory, as well 
as confusing, state for very long. Unless substantial changes are 
made in the law of defamation or remedies are granted under other 
state and federal statutes, there will be constant requests to re-ex-
amine Paul v. Davis and to grant a constitutionally based cause of 
action, either under section 1983, against state officials, or under the 
103. See R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 591, 598A (Tent. Draft No. 20, 
1974). 
104. See Lombardo v. Stokes, 18 N.Y.2d 394, 222 N.E.2d 721 (1966) (president 
of municipal college, semble). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591, Comment 
c (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974), asserts that several states have followed federal law 
and extended the absolute privilege to all employees however minor but that "the 
greater number of state courts have refused to make this extension." However, all 
but three of the cases proffered as support for the statement antedated Barr v. Matteo. 
Id. at 184-85. In fact most of the cases cited were decided before 1920. On the 
other hand, the five cases cited in which the extension was made were all decided 
after 1950. 
105. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964). 
106. See notes 51-61 supra and accompanying text. 
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Bivens doctrine, against federal officials.107 But, should the Court 
move in this direction, it will be faced with two additional problems. 
First, such a doctrinal resolution would be tantamount to overruling 
Barr v. Matteo, and, second, it would be a partial overruling of 
Sullivan. The reason for this second effect is that, under Wood v. 
Strickland1°8 and Scheuer v. Rhodes,100 a defendant in a civil rights 
action can successfully defend himself against an otherwise valid claim 
if he both acted in good faith and had an objectively reasonable basis 
foJ.'. his action. If he lacked an objectively reasonable basis for his 
actions, however, he would almost certainly be negligent and would 
therefore be subject to liability. Accordingly, to grant the civil rights 
action for injury to reputation would be, in effect, an adoption of the 
Gertz requirements of fault and actual damages in all actions against 
public officials, even if they are brought by public figures, unless the 
Court divides the universe of civil rights actions into a class based 
on good faith and negligence on the one hand, and a class based on 
intentional or reckless conduct on the other. If the Gertz require-
ments are applied to all actions against public officials, however, it 
will be easier for a public figure to bring an action against a public 
official than against other potential defendants, since the latter would, 
presumably, still be protected by Sullivan. From the Court's point 
of view, these problems may well seem insoluble. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The law in the area of injury to reputation is on the verge of 
chaos. Attempts by the Court to eliminate confusion have almo~t 
invariably increased it. 110 The underlying reason for these diffi-
culties is likely traced to the fundamental assumption in Sullivan 
that it is possible to have different standards of liability depend-
ing on who is involved or, as the later cases have demonstrated, 
on what is involved. The result has been to put tremendous 
pressure on the fact-finding process, which is asked to make 
largely subjective determinations, such as who is a public fig-
101. Cases like Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), will only increase the 
pressure for some sort of remedy against official actions injuring reputation. In 
Imbler it was held that no action under section 1983 could be brought against a 
prosecuting attorney for the knowing use of false testimony against an accused. 
Accordingly, there will be a strong urge to give citizens at least a remedy against 
extra-judicial statements. It must not be forgotten that, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167, 173 (1961), the Court expressly stated that one of the purposes of section 
1983 was to provide a federal remedy when those afforded under state law were inade-
quate. 
108. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
109. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
110. See note 83 supra. 
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ure and what is newsworthy. These questions are rehashed by 
judges when they decide the supposed question of law, "what is a 
matter of legitimate public concern or interest." The system is sim-
ply incapable of making these determinations in a consistent and in-
tellectually satisfying manner. The most feasible options are either 
to apply the Sullivan criteria to all types of defamation or to apply 
the Gertz requirements of fault, in the form of mere negligence and 
actual damages, to all types of defamation. The latter alternative 
would, of course, require the Court to repudiate the distinctions, 
such as those between public and private figures and matters of legit-
imate and illegitimate public concern, that formed the basis of the 
reasoning presented to support its actual decision in Gertz. While 
I cannot deny the p~rsonal attractiveness of applying the Sullivan cri-
teria to all situations, I am prepared to hazard a guess that the across-
the-board application of the Gertz standards is more likely.111 Of 
course, as Gertz itself recognized, a plaintiff who can demonstrate 
constitutional malice as defined in Sullivan may be able also to re-
cover punitive damages. But he will not have to meet those stand-
ards to recover his actual damages, which, under Gertz, include hu-
miliation and mental suffering, as well as pecuniary loss. 
My reasons for reaching the conclusion that the Court will follow 
this approach are partially based on the need to meet the problem 
uncovered by Paul v. Davis. Redress must be given, whether under 
the guise of a civil rights action or an action for defamation, when 
public officials injure the reputations of citizens by issuing false state-
ments. In this regard, I am inclined to believe that Barr v. Matteo 
will be overruled, or at least substantially modified. Another reason 
to believe the Court will be obliged to generalize the Gertz solution 
to cover all cases of injury to reputation is -the Court's gradually in-
creasing awareness that many of the traditional methods of distin- · 
guishing among types of speech do not make much sense. For ex-
ample, the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech 
is breaking down, 112 as well it should. Freedom of speech is, after all, 
of concern in commercial as well as in other contexts.113 Similarly, in 
111. That is, to make my position absolutely clear, the Court will have to retreat 
from its assertion in Gertz that the Sullivan standards still apply in actions brought 
by public officials or public figures. As previously noted, see text at notes 84-90 
supra, the Court will also have to retreat from its completely untenable intimation in 
Gertz that the old common law of defamation may still apply in cases brought by 
private citizens against other, nonmedia, private citizens. On this latter point, 
Eaton, supra note 18, at 1450, suggests that the Court will have to abandon its intima-
tion in Gertz, but he refuses to take a clear stand on the issue. 
112. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). 
113, On May 19, 1976, the American Law Institute, in adopting a proposed 
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the field of injury to reputation, injurious falsehood in the broad sense 
is actually the issue. It is pointless to develop a system in which 
an admittedly injurious false statement is or is not actionable depend-
ing solely on whether it would have been considered defamatory at 
common law, or whether it would fit into the narrow category of in-
jurious falsehood at common law because it amounted to slander of 
·title or disparagement of property. Indeed, the fact that the most 
frequently litigated category of slander per se is injury affecting busi-
ness and professional relationships evidences this inability to confine 
the law of defamation within its historical mold.114 Until recently, 
an observer would have been fairly confident in predicting that a 
janitor who was called a "dead-beat who never paid his bills" could 
probably not have been able to succeed in an action for slander.115 
In our modem society, where a person who is unable to purchase 
a car on credit cannot drive to work and where civil service regula-
§ 623A, Liability for Publication of Injurious Falsehood, for the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, expressly noted that the constitutional defenses applied to all 
injurious falsehoods, including those that related solely to commercial matters, and 
not merely those that were defamatory (personal recollection of author confirmed 
by correspondence with the Reporter, Dean Wade). In this regard, it should be 
pointed out that in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976), the plaintiff 
had withdrawn her claim for damages for injury to reputation shortly before the trial. 
This made her claim somewhat like a common-law action for injurious falsehood, 
except for the fact that her damages probably did not constitute "pecuniary loss," a 
usual requirement in the traditional injurious falsehood case. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (Proposed Draft May 19, 1976). This circumstance 
again shows that the eventual resolution of the major policy issue involved here 
cannot consist merely of a rearrangement of narrow common-law remedies. A more 
general solution will be necessary. The fact that Mrs. Firestone withdrew her claim 
for damages for injury to reputation also makes her case somewhat analogous to the 
"false light" invasion of privacy cases in which plaintiff seeks redress for nondefama-
tory falsehoods. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). See also Cantrell v. 
Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). The problem with this rationale in 
Mrs. Firestone's case is that the matter of which she complains-a false accusation 
of having been divorced for adultery-is clearly defamatory. Of course, as Justice 
Rehnquist pointed out, the fact that Mrs. Firestone was prepared to waive one item 
of damages found in most defamation actions does not necessarily mean, as a logical 
matter, that her cause of action was not in fact one for defamation. 424 U.S. at 460. 
These circumstances are a further indication of the need for a general solution. 
114. Compare the comments and citation of case authority accompanying RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573 (Slanderous Imputations Affecting Business, 
Trade, Profession or Office) (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974), with those accompanying 
§ 571 (Slanderous Imputation of Criminal Conduct), § 572 (Slanderous Imputation 
of Loathsome Disease), and § 574 (Slanderous Imputation of Sexual Misconduct). 
The comments accompanying § 573 note the large number of cases and the impossi-
bility of narrowly confining the range of situations that may be covered. 
115. See Liebel v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 103 Mont. 370, 62 P.2d 667 (1936) 
(stenographer in a law office falsely accused of not paying her debts has no cause 
of action); Hudson v. Pioneer Serv. Co., 218 Ore .. 561, 346 P.2d 123 (1959) (same 
as to logger accused of being a delinquent debtor). The classic case at common law 
denying recovery was that of a clerk of a gas company accused of consorting with 
"whores." Lumby v. Alida)'., 148 Eng. Rep. 1434 (Ex. 1831). 
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tions require civil servants to refrain from "dishonest . . or notori-
ously disgraceful conduct,"116 this prediction no longer can be made 
with any certainty. The evolving modem view is that the actual ca-
pacity of the falsehood to injure is the crucial factor in determining 
whether a statement is actionable, and not the largely academic de-
termination of whether the statement would have been actionable 
in the nineteenth century. 
We thus have a situation where· an individual's interest in free-
dom of speech, which is guaranteed him by the Constitution, clashes 
in many instances with the expanding interest of another individual 
in the integrity of his reputation. This latter interest was denied pro-
tection in Paul v. Davis, but it was recognized as worthy of constitu-
tional protection in Roth and McKeithen. Indeed, Firestone and 
Gertz are themselves cases where this interest prevailed over a de-
fendant's interest in free speech. However appealing Sullivan's partial 
resolution of the conflict might be, there is no way of confining that 
holding to similar situations and preventing its expansion to practically 
the whole field of injurious falsehood, which now includes areas that 
were once denied first amendment protection because they were con-
sidered commercial speech. At the same time, it does not appear that 
the Court or our society is prepared to abandon its concern for the 
protection of the individual's reputation. The only way to accommo-
date all the conflicting interests in a manner that is socially acceptable, 
therefore, will be to generalize the Gertz negligence and actual dam-
age solution. 
There are many who may regret this resolution but, after Sullivan 
and its progeny, there is no returning to the <;>ther possible means that 
might have been used to deal with the very real abuses of the common 
law of defamation, such as tighter control of damages, 117 stricter atten-
tion to the adequacy of the colloquium, 118 and, above all, more com-
mon sense standards relating to what is substantial truth110 and the 
frank recognition, without the necessity of prompting by the Supreme 
Court, that mere statements of opinion carrying no false factual impli-
116. See 5 C.F.R. § 731.202{b)(2), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,047 (1975). 
117. In the United Kingdom, for example, the House of Lords has materially 
cut down on the ability of plaintiffs to secure punitive damages. Rookes v. Barnard, 
[1964] A.C. 1129, 1 All E.R. 367, a decision that was applied to cases of defamation. 
See Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1 All E.R. 801. 
118. This is the part of the complaint in an action for defamation that alleges 
and shows that the statements were made about the plaintiff. In New York Times 
Co. :v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288-92 (1964), an alternative holding was that no 
reasonable man could conclude that the defamatory statements involved in that case 
were made about the plaintiff. 
119. In the Sullivan case, the Court flirted with the possibility of declaring that 
the advertisement in question was substantially true as a matter of law. 376 U.S. at 
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cations are not actionable.120 One advantage of the present sugges-
tion for the Court's resolution of its self-generated dilemma is that it 
will open the way for the abandonment of the libel/ slander distinc-
tion and the concomitant distinction, made in many states, between 
libel per se and libel per quad. Unless recklessness can be shown, 
actual damages will be required, but the arcane learning on what 
constitutes "special damages" could become a matter of interest only 
to historians.121 Future law students would then be spared the time 
spent wondering why the refusal of a person's fiancee to marry him 
might constitute special damages122 ( although not in the present day 
constituting a particularly grievous form of economic loss), while a 
$10,000 doctor's bill for a nervous breakdown does not.123 
289. A good argument could be made that on the facts presented in Sullivan the 
English courts would have sustained a defense of truth. See I. SALMOND, TORTS 160-
61 (16th ed. R. F. V. Heuston 1973). 
120. This approach would have required repudiation of the positively ridiculous 
position, embraced by the American Law Institute as recently as 1974, that mere 
opinion and even ridicule, unaccompanied by defamatory factual implications, could 
be actionable. See note 58 supra. In commenting on RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 566 
(1938), Professor Arthur Goodhart wrote, 
Illustration ( 1) . . . is rather a strange one. It holds that to state of a political 
opponent who has blocked reform measures that he "is no better than a mur-
derer'' is defamatory. It is probable that the English courts would hold that this 
was merely a form of abuse, and therefore not actionable. American political 
controversies must be conducted on a very high level if such a remark is held to 
fall within the law of defamation. 
Goodhart, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Volume Ill: A Comparison Between 
American and English Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 283-84 (1941). Professor Good-
hart's view is borne out by the subsequent case of Slim v. Daily Telegraph Ltd., [1968] 
2 Q.B. 157, 1 All E.R. 497 (C.A.). Professor Goodhart also commented, in a 
similar vein, on the position in section 601 of the Restatement "that a conditional 
privilege is lost if the maker of the statement, although believing the defamatory 
matter to be true, has no reasonable grounds for so believing." Id. at 289. Again, 
subsequent decisions have supported Goodhart's assertion that English law takes 
what I would call a more common-sense approach to the matter. See Horrocks v. 
Lowe, [1975] A.C. 135, 1 All E.R. 662 (so long as statement is believed in, it is 
privileged no matter how unreasonable or prejudiced). For a very recent discussion 
that places major emphasis on the question of defamatory opinion in English and 
American law, see Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 Tux. L. REv. 
1221 (1976). 
121. I am assuming that the state courts, when confronted with the need to find 
actual damages in all cases of defamation, as well as other cases of injurious false-
hood, will not insist on creating a sub-category of situations in which not only actual 
damages but special damages, as that term is understood at common law, are required. 
Of course, where the falsehood is not defamatory, i.e., has no apparent effect on a 
person's reputation, the states may insist on a showing of pecuniary loss because 
otherwise there may be no showing of actual harm. It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that "special damages" at common law is a more restrictive term than pecuniary 
loss. See text at notes 122-23 infra. 
122. See Moody v. Baker, 5 Cow. (N.Y.) 351 (1826). 
123. See Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54 (1858). 
